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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the election of Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland as the new
Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO, or the
Organization),1 the future of WHO has been a much discussed
topic. For many years, WHO has come under attack from public
health and political leaders who believe that it has become
inefficient and ineffective. Many reform proposals have been
suggested in public health literature; however, under Director2
General Hiroshi Nakajima, WHO reform never progressed far.
Brundtland's selection has rejuvenated the hopes of many inside
and outside the Organization who wish to see WHO return to the
3
greatness of its halcyon days.
An emerging issue in discussions of WHO's future is what
role international law should have in WHO's global public health
mission. Historically, WHO has ignored international law. 4 In a
seminal 1992 article, Allyn Taylor, an American legal scholar and
WHO consultant, made the first significant case for WHO to take

1.
See World Health Organization, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland Elected
Director-Generalof the World Health Organization,Press Release WHA/3, May 13,
1998.
2.
See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, WHO in Crisis,309 BRIT. MED. J. 1424 (1994).

3.

The Brundtland Era Begins, 351 LANcET 381, 381 (1998) ("After a decade

of decline, weak leadership, allegations of corruption at all levels, and paranoid
defensiveness when any kind of external scrutiny was conducted, WHO now has
an opportunity to reclaim its confidence and influence.").
4.
See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
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international law more seriously than it historically has.5 This
Author has made similar arguments, specifically in connection
with WHO's approach to emerging infectious diseases.6 The
literature also contains a growing recognition of the importance of
other international legal regimes, especially international trade
law, to WHO's future. 7 The contrast between WHO's historical
attitude and the emerging interest in the importance of
international law to WHO's work creates an opportunity to explore
what role international law should play in WHO's future. 8
This Article argues that WHO should take international law
more seriously than it has in the past by developing an
understanding of how international law already affects global
health concerns and by using international law as a strategy to
support WHO's mandate of furthering humanity's health. In
addition, this Article develops the concept of global health

5.
See Allyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work.- A Legal
Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED.
301 (1992) [hereinafter Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work]. See
also Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Public Health: Regulation, Norms and
Standards at the Global Level, Background Paper for the Multilateral Conference
on World Health Cooperation, Mexico City, Mexico (Mar. 29 - Apr. 1, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Taylor, Globalization

and Public Health].
6.
See generally David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77 (1996)
[hereinafter Fidler, Globalization, InternationalLaw]; David P. Fidler, Legal Issues
Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Resistance, 4 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
169 (1998); see also David P. Fidler, The Role of InternationalLaw in the Control of
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 95 BULL. DE L'INSTITUT PASTEUR 57 (1997)
[hereinafter Fidler, The Role of International Law]; David P. Fidler, Return of the
FourthHorseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and InternationalLaw, 81 MINN. L.
REv. 771 (1997) [hereinafter Fidler, Return of the FourthHorsemen].
7.
See Bruce J. Plotkin & Anne-Marie Kimball, Designing the International
Policy and Legal Framework for the Control of Emerging Infectious Diseases: First
Steps, 3 EMERGING INFECTIous DISEASES 1 (1997) (discussing the importance of
international trade law and the World Trade Organization to the strategy for
emerging infectious diseases); see also David P. Fidier, Trade and Health- The
Global Spread of Diseases and International Trade, 40 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 300
(1997) (analyzing the link between trade and health and the importance of
international trade law) [hereinafter Fidier, Trade and Health]; see, e.g., Derek
Yach & Douglas W. Bettcher, The Globalization of Public Health, Part 1: Threats
and Opportunities, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 735 (1998) (noting the importance of
international trade, human rights, and environmental protection to global public
health concerns and arguing for an enhanced role for international legal
instruments, standard setting, and global norms); Taylor, Globalization and
Public Health, supra note 5, at 13 (arguing for better WHO coordination with
other international organizations).
8.
See, e.g., Taylor, Globalization and Public Health, supra note 5, at 10
(noting that "the emergence of new leadership at WHO has been accompanied by
unprecedented burgeoning interest, meetings and activities related to national
and international public health law").
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jurisprudence to provide a comprehensive framework into which
the Organization can integrate its international legal endeavors.
The concept of global health jurisprudence helps clarify that WHO
faces legal challenges not only internationally, but also nationally,
and both must be addressed in an integrated and comprehensive
manner. Creating global health jurisprudence will prove a difficult
and frustrating task for WHO and will require the Organization to
develop and utilize public health law capabilities that it has never
thought necessary. Despite this formidable challenge, pursuit of
global health jurisprudence constitutes a strategy that WHO
needs to include as an essential element of its future global health
policy.
Part II provides a brief history of international health law by
analyzing (1) international legal activity from the mid-nineteenth
century until WHO's creation, (2) the constitutional authority
WHO possesses to develop international health law, and (3) how
WHO has neglected international law during most of its fifty-year
existence. Part III contrasts WHO's historical attitude towards
international law with general developments in international law
since 1945 and with how other international organizations have
used international law to address global problems. Part IV
attempts to explain why WHO neglected international law during
its first fifty years by focusing on the adverse legal consequences
of the Organization's "medical-technical ethos." Part V addresses

the skeptical perspective that, even if WHO had been more
involved with international law, such involvement would have
made little difference to global public health because international
law is a weak institution in international relations. Part VI
examines the role of international law in WHO's future and argues
that WHO is facing an international legal tsunami that will
require a sea change in its attitude towards international law.
Part VII presents the concept of global health jurisprudence as a
possible framework for WHO to use in integrating national and
international law into its future public health mission.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW
A. A Century of InternationalLegal Activity
In thinking about WHO's stance on international law, it is
important to note that the structure and dynamics of
international relations force states to use international law in

19981
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international health cooperation. 9 WHO's lack of interest in
international law is anomalous in the history of international
health cooperation. The nature of many public health concerns,
such as infectious diseases, tobacco control, and narcotic drugs,
is such that these issues escape the control of individual
sovereign states and instead become matters of importance in
interstate relations.' 0 Historically, once public health problems
entered the realm of the international system, states turned to
international law as a tool to develop common rules, institutions,
and values. As a result, WHO's lack of interest in international
law does not reflect the historical experience of states and
international health organizations prior to World War II. While
WHO has been accused of focusing too little on international law,
international relations immediately prior to World War II were
plagued by too much international health law. This crude
comparison invites a brief look at how international health law
developed prior to, and after the creation of, WHO. This historical
perspective creates a better context for arguments in favor of
more international legal activity at the Organization.
International health law was born during the first
International Sanitary Conference held in 1851.11 Cholera
epidemics in Europe forced European states to realize that
protecting their territories from disease importation and easing
trade burdens imposed by quarantine measures required
international cooperation. 12 Infectious disease control had been a
national interest of states since the formation of the modern
states system, as evidenced by the widespread adoption of
national quarantine regulations by European states prior to the
nineteenth century.13 But, "[pirior to the first International
Sanitary Conference in 1851, national disease control measures

9.
See Fidler, Globalization, InternationalLaw, supranote 6, at 79; Fidler,
The Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 6, at 58.
10.
See David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging
Infectious Diseases and InternationalRelations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11,
23-25 (1997) (analyzing how infectious diseases became international issues)
[hereinafter Fidiler, The Globalization of Public Health]; Allyn L. Taylor, An
InternationalRegulatory Strategyfor Global Tobacco Control,22 YALE J. INT'L L. 257

(1996) (analyzing tobacco control as an international problem) [hereinafter Taylor,
Global Tobacco Control].
11.
The 1851 Conference produced "a convention and regulations
designed to bring some uniformity into quarantine practice."
NEVILLE M.
GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK 46 (2d ed. 1971).

12.
See id. at 36-42 (analyzing factors that led to the convening of the
1851 Conference).
13.
See David P. Fidler, Microbialpolitik: Infectious Diseases and
International Relations, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1998) (forthcoming)
(analyzing infectious disease control as a national interest of states prior to the

nineteenth century) [hereinafter Fidler, Microbialpolitik].
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were not topics for international diplomacy." 14 Increasing volumes
and speed of international trade gradually transformed national
quarantine measures into an international systemic concern
because of the increasing burdens such measures placed on
maritime commerce. s Once part of the dynamics of the
international system, public health problems implicated
16
interneational law as an instrument of interstate cooperation.
Given the structure of the international system, the only way
states could achieve their goals of better protection from disease
importation and reduced quarantine burdens on trade was
through international cooperation and international law.
The goal of the first International Sanitary Conference was 17a
treaty; a treaty was negotiated, but it never entered into force.
Every International Sanitary Conference from 1851 to 1938
sought to produce an international agreement of some kind.1 8
Many of these conferences succeeded in this objective, producing
a plethora of international agreements on infectious disease
control by the eve of World War I. 19
While the major activity of the 1851-1940 era took place in
human infectious disease control, states also engaged in activity
connected with animal diseases. In 1924, states created the
International Office of Epizootics to coordinate international
action on animal diseases.2 0 Other treaties on animal diseases
followed. 2 ' Nor were plant diseases ignored. Perhaps the earliest
treaty that actually came into force on controlling the
international spread of a disease was an 1878 agreement
addressing a plant louse, Phylloxera vastatrix.2 2 States later

14.
Id. at 18.
15.
Id.
16.
See Fidler, The Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 6, at 58 (arguing
that "the critical role of international law in infectious disease control has been
recognized since at least the mid-19th century").
17.
See GOODMAN, supranote 11, at 46-50.
18.
See generally NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONFERENCES, 1851-1938 (1975).

19.
See International Health Security in the Modem World: The Sanitary
Conventions and the World Health Organization, 17 DEP"r ST. BULL. No. 437, at 953
(1947).
20.
International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International
Office for Dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals, Jan. 25, 1924, 57
L.N.T.S. 135.
21.
See, e.g., International Convention for the Campaign Against
Contagious Diseases in Animals and Declarations, Feb. 20, 1935, 186 L.N.T.S.
173; Convention with regard to Safeguarding Livestock Interests through the
Prevention of Infectious and Contagious Diseases, Mar. 16, 1928, Mexico-U.S.,
106 L.N.T.S. 481.
22.
Convention between Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Portugal and
Switzerland Respecting Measures to be Taken Against Phylloxera Vastatrx, Sept.
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concluded another treaty on plant protection. 2 3 Public health
concerns also led states to negotiate international treaties on the
alcohol trade to Africa 2 4 and on psychotropic drugs.2 5
A detailed examination of the significant number of treaties
produced between 1851 and 1940 is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, this Article focuses on the substantive objectives
of the major treaties on infectious disease control. The approaches

that used international law during this period generally pursued
one or more of the following objectives: (1) protecting Europeans
and North Americans from diseases from less affluent regions; (2)
harmonizing national public health measures, such as
quarantine, to reduce burdens on trade; (3) establishing
international surveillance for diseases; and (4) creating
international health organizations. 26 Separating these objectives
for analytical purposes is useful, but the dynamics of
international legal activity changed from 1851, when the
emphasis was largely on quarantine harmonization, to the
International Sanitary Conventions of 1912 and 1926, where the
emphasis was on surveillance administered through an
international health organization. 2 7 The force that caused this
shift in international health law was science. Once scientists
proved "germ theory" correct and began to understand how
pathogenic microbes caused illness, scientific principles began to
guide the substance of international health law in two major
respects.2 8 First, surveillance became central to international
health law on infectious diseases. 2 9 In addition, proper

17, 1878, 153 Consol. T. S. 247 (protecting plant life and health through reducing
the threat to wine vineyards from a plant louse).
23.
International Convention for the Protection of Plants, Apr. 16, 1929,

126 L.N.T.S. 305.
24.
Convention Relating to Liquor Traffic in Africa and Protocol, Sept. 10,
1919, 8 L.N.T.S. 11.

25.

See Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in

Dangerous Drugs, June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299; see also Agreement
concerning the Suppression of Opium-Smoking, Nov. 27, 1931, 177 L.N.T.S. 373;

Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 139 L.N.T.S. 301; International Convention,

Adopted by the Second Opium Conference, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317;
Agreement concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in
and Use of Prepared Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337; International Opium
Convention of Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
26.

See DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, ch. 2

(1999) (forthcoming Mar. 1999) (analyzing these four objectives in the 1851-1951
period).

27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29.

Id.; see Fidler, Trade and Health, supranote 7, at 311 ("Science pointed

to the need for surveillance and public health policies
epidemiological nature of the pathogen in question.").

driven by the
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surveillance
required
permanent
international
health
organizations that could establish and operate surveillance
systems.3 0 By the mid-1920s, four international health
organizations had been established: the Pan-American Sanitary
Bureau (1902),31 the International Office of Public Health
(1907),32 the Health Office of the League of Nations (1923), 3 3 and
the International Office of Epizootics (1924).3 4 Second, scientific
and public health principles began forming the basis for the
harmonization of national quarantine measures through
international agreements. International legal harmonization of
quarantine measures through scientific principles directly affected
the linkage between trade and health because "the scientificallybased measures needed to protect public health better resulted in
35
fewer and less onerous restrictions on international trade."
Not only did international law play a role in the international
system when international trade brought public health problems
into the realm of diplomacy, but it also contributed to public
health becoming a feature of the developing international society.
Using Hedley Bull's definition of international society,3 6 the
development of international health law and international health
organizations evidenced that "states bound themselves to a
common set of rules and to sharing in the working of common
37
institutions."
B. WHO's InternationalLegal Authority
At WHO's creation, the founders believed that international
law would continue to play a central role in international health
activities. Not only did the WHO Constitution provide WHO with
the power to promote and adopt treaties, but it also created an

30.

See FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supranote 26,

at ch. 2.
31.

See PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRO SALUTE Novi MUNDI: A

HISTORY OF THE PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION 20 (1992).

32.
See Rome Agreement of 1907 Establishing the International Office of
Public Health, reprintedin GOODMAN, supranote 11, at 10 1-04.
33.
See GOODMAN, supranote 11, at 110-11 (discussing the establishment

of the Health Organization of the League of Nations).
34.
See International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an
International Office for Dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals, supra note
18.
35.
Fidler, Trade and Health, supranote 7, at 312.
36.
See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 13 (1977) (An international
society "exdsts when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by
a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the
working of common institutions.").
37.
Fidler, Microbialpolitik,supranote 13, at 23.
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innovative international legal mechanism in the form of binding
regulations. 38 Article 19 of the WHO Constitution states that the
World Health Assembly (WHA) "shall have the authority to adopt
conventions and agreements with respect to any matter within
the competence of the Organization." 3 9 The combination of WHO's
ambitious objective, "the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health,"4 0 and its expansive definition of health,
"a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity," 4 1 provided WHO's
Article 19 with treaty-making power of virtually limitless
potential, and which far exceeded any treaty powers possessed by
the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, International Office of Public
Health, or the Health Office of the League of Nations.
In Article 21 of the WHO Constitution, WHO founders created
an innovative international legal process by providing for
regulations that are binding on Member States. 42 Under Article 21,
the WHA has the authority to adopt regulations in five specific
areas: (1) sanitary and quarantine regulations; (2) nomenclatures
on diseases, causes of death, and public health practices; (3)
standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; (4)
standards for the safety, purity, and potency of biological,
pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international
commerce; and (5) advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international
commerce.4
The unifying theme of these areas is the international nature
of public health and the need to harmonize national behavior
through international standards based on scientific and public
health principles. As with the Article 19 treaty power, Article 21
underscores
how
important
WHO's
founders
believed
international law would be in WHO's future work. The historical
experiences of states grappling with international problems of
infectious diseases from 1851 to 1940 provided empirical evidence
supporting a vigorous WHO approach to international law.

The Article 21 procedure was made more innovative through
the "contracting out" procedure of Article 22.44 Under Article 22,
regulations adopted under Article 21 come into force for each
WHO Member State unless a Member State notifies WHO of
reservations to, or rejection of, the adopted regulations within a

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See WHO CONST. art. 21.
Id. art. 19.
Id. at preamble.
Id.
See WHO CONST.art. 21.
See id.
See id. art. 22.
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fixed period of time. 45 In other words, a WHO Member State
becomes bound in international law by Article 21 regulations
unless that Member State affirmatively opts out. In traditional
international law, a state does not become bound by a treaty until

that state affirmatively opts in to the regime. 46 Article 22 makes it
harder for WHO Member States to reject regulations if they have
47
to contract out of them.
Article 21 and Article 22 create a quasi-legislative process
that was, at the time of WHO's origins in the late 1940s, a radical
approach in international law. 48 In 1989, WHO's Legal Counsel
stated that "[alt the time of their introduction, the International
Health Regulations were a novel, and indeed revolutionary,
instrument."49 However, it is important to remember the context
in which this quasi-legislative power was created. States were
already aware that public health, especially in connection with
infectious diseases, had to be viewed from a global perspective.
Not only was there a need for international standards in key
areas, but the global nature of public health also created a need
to have those standards applied as widely as possible throughout
the international system.
WHO's founders believed that the ad hoc treaty approach,
which had dominated international health cooperation since
1851, was necessary but not sufficient to address world health
problems in the second half of the twentieth century. They
responded with international legal creativity in Article 21 and
Article 22. Walter Sharp wrote in 1947 that "[iun the future there
will be a permanent mechanism through which steps can be
taken periodically with a view to broadening the scope and
strengthening the provisions of world health law. This represents
a distinct advance in international legislative technique for the
health field."5 0
WHO's international legal powers were not intended to be
admired, but to be used. One function of WHO is to propose

45.

Id.

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (4th ed.
1990) ("The maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent necprosunt expresses the fundamental
principle that a treaty applies only between the parties to it.").
47.
See Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 836.
48.
See InternationalHealth Security in the Modem World, supra note 19, at
958 (stating that Article 21 and Article 22 of the WHO Constitution constitute a
significant advance in the field of international health); see also Walter R. Sharp,
The New World Health Organization, 41 AM. J. INTL L. 509, 525 (1947) (noting
innovation in the "contracting out" procedure).
49.
Claude-Henri Vignes, The Future of International Health Law: WHO
Perspectives,40 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEG. 16, 18 (1989).
46.

50.

Sharp, supranote 48, at 524-25.
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conventions, agreements, and regulations. 5 1 The scope and vision
of WHO's purpose meant these international legal powers should be
used, where helpful, in all public health endeavors, not just in
infectious disease control. In addition, the WHO Constitution
foreshadowed the importance of other areas of international law to
WHO's mission by embedding references to human rights,
52
international trade, and environmental conditions.
WHO began its work preceded by a long heritage of
international legal activity on infectious disease control and in
international health organizations. This heritage encouraged
WHO's founders to construct a comprehensive and innovative
framework that would help develop international law to support
global health. Created at the beginning of the most revolutionary
period in the history of international law, WHO was endowed with
a set of international legal powers unprecedented in the history of
international health organizations and international organizations
generally.
C. A Half-Century of Neglect
Since 1948, the potential for international legal activity
created by the WHO Constitution has remained untapped.
Between 1948 and 1998, WHO never utilized its international
legal authority under Article 19, and only twice adopted
regulations under Article 21. The first time WHO ever started a
process under Article 19 came in 1996 when the WHA instructed
the Director-General to develop an international framework
convention for tobacco control for future adoption under Article
19.53 The regulations adopted under Article 21 concerned
nomenclature 54 and infectious disease control, the latter
regulations known currently as the International Health
Regulations (IHR).5 5 Not only is WHO's inactivity reflected in the
very short list of regulations, but it is also seen in the way WHO
allowed the IHR to disintegrate as a framework for international
infectious disease control.5 6 The IHR have the fundamental

51.
52.

See WHO CONST. art. 2(k).
See id. at preamble (human rights), art. 21(d)-(e) (international trade),

art. 2(i) (environmental conditions).
53.
See International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, World
HealthAssembly, Res. WHA49.17, May 26, 1996.

54.

For discussion of the Nomenclature Regulations, see S. S. Fluss, World

Health Organization,in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWs: MEDICAL LAW 15-16
(H. Nys ed., 1993).
55.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d
ed. 1983) [hereinafter INT'L HEALTH REG.].
56.
See Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 843-5 1; see
also Allyn L. Taylor, Controllingthe Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Towards a
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purpose of ensuring "the maximum security against the
international spread of diseases with a minimum interference
with world traffic."5 7 The IHR establish rules to support a global
surveillance system for diseases subject to the IHR to achieve the
goal of maximum security against the international spread of
diseases.5 8 WHO Member States have to report outbreaks of
cholera, plague, and yellow fever to the WHO, which then
disseminates the information to other Member States. 5 9 To
achieve the objective of disease control with minimum
interference with world traffic, the IHR provide for "the most
restrictive health measures that a [M]ember [SItate may take to
protect its territory against the diseases subject to the IHR." 60 The
IHR rules on maximum protection and minimum interference are
interdependent. WHO Member States are unlikely to report
disease outbreaks unless they can be assured that other Member
States will not enact irrational trade-restricting measures that
harm the economy of the reporting Member State. Similarly, WHO
Member States are more likely to follow the IHR rules on
minimum interference with world traffic when they receive full
information about disease outbreaks in other Member States.
Unfortunately, WHO has achieved neither maximum
protection against the international spread of diseases nor
minimum interference with world traffic. The global surveillance
system broke down because (1) WHO Member States routinely
failed to report required information to the WHO, and (2) the
focus on only three diseases proved inadequate to support a
proper global surveillance system for infectious diseases. 6 1 WHO
Member States also regularly violated the rules designed to
ensure that disease control measures resulted in minimum
interference with world traffic by applying excessive measures to
the travelers and trade of Member States suffering disease
outbreaks. 62 Neither the WHO Constitution nor the IHR give WHO
any enforcement powers to use in connection with violations of
binding rules of international law. 63 The IHR only provide a
dispute settlement procedure that Member States can use against
65
each other; 64 but this procedure has been used infrequently.

Reinforced Role for the International Health Regulations, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1327,
1341-46 (1997) [hereinafter Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious
Diseases].
57.
INT'L HEALTH REG., supranote 55, at 5.
58.
See Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 839.
59.
See INTAL HEALTH REG., supranote 55, arts. 1, 3, at 8, 10.

61.

Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman,supra note 6, at 841.
See id. at 844-45 (discussing breakdown of JHR surveillance system).

62.
63.
64.

See id. at 846-47 (discussing excessive measures).
See id. at 847-49 (discussing lack of WHO enforcement power).
See INT'L HEALTH REG., supranote 55, art. 93, at 4 1.

60.
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The end result of this situation of widespread violation without
enforcement has been that "many legally binding Regulations
66
tend to be treated in practice almost as recommendations."
The only other international legal initiative this Author has
been able to identify is WHO's attempt to get the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule that any use of nuclear weapons

would violate international law because of the adverse health
consequences that would result from such use. 6 7 The ICJ held
that WHO had no competence to ask the ICJ to make such a
ruling on nuclear weapons. 6 8 This uncharacteristic international
legal effort by WHO may, however, have had less to do with global
public health than with the politics of nuclear weapons between
nuclear states and non-nuclear states. In this nuclear
controversy, WHO's health mandate may have been seen as a
convenient Trojan Horse for non-nuclear states to promote their
position vis-A-vis nuclear states.
The bad news about WHO's international legal performance
unfortunately does not end with the near total abandonment of its
function of developing international health law through treaties
and regulations. WHO has also shown little interest in giving
substantive meaning to the human right to health boldly
proclaimed in the WHO Constitution. 69 WHO paid little attention
to international human rights law until the HIV/AIDS pandemic
shocked WHO into showing concern about the public health
consequences of human rights violations. In a development
bordering on the surreal, WHO went from having no discernible
interest in international human rights law to proclaiming that
such law provided the basis for addressing the HIV/AIDS
70
pandemic.
More recently, similar shocks have jolted WHO into rethinking
its decades-old myopia about international law. In connection with
WHO's general international legal powers, in January 1998, WHO's
Executive Board approved recommendations from a Special Group

65.

66.
67.

See Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 848.
DAVID LEIVE, 1 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 46 (1976).

See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (World Health

Organization), 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
68.
See id. at para. 31. For an analysis of the ICJ's ruling in this case, see

generally C.F. Amerasinghe, The Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice
in the WHO Nuclear Weapons Case:A Critique, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 525 (1997).

69.
See Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work, supra note 5,
at 328; see also Fortress WHO: Breaching the Ramparts for Health's Sake, 345
LANcET 203, 204 (1995) ("The interface of health and human rights has been
studiously ignored.").
70.
See Jonathan M. Mann, Aftenvord to LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZITA
LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 167-69 (1997)

(describing development of WHO's human rights approach to HIV/AIDS).
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that reviewed the WHO Constitution to expand WHO's power to
adopt regulations under Article 21 to include any matter falling
within the functions of WHO. 7 1 Such an expansion of Article 21
powers would, if eventually adopted by the WHA, give WHO the
same scope of authority to formulate binding regulations as is
granted in the Article 19 power to adopt treaties. 72
The global crisis in emerging infectious diseases prompted
WHO to begin a revision of the moribund and largely mothballed
IHR.7 ,3 WHO held an Informal Consultation on the International
Response to Epidemics and the Applications of the International
Health Regulations, which developed principles and recommendations to guide the IHR revision process. 74 In February,
1998, WHO circulated a provisional draft of the revised IHR (IHR
Provisional Draft) to its Member States. 7s The WHO hopes to have
the new IHR adopted by the WHA in May 2000.76
The growing specter of global pandemics involving
noncommunicable diseases caused by tobacco consumption
produced enough political will for WHO to propose an
international framework convention for tobacco control. 77 As
noted previously, this proposal marked the first time that WHO
ever sought to exercise its Article 19 powers granted by the WHO
Constitution. The increasingly global nature of the strategies of
major tobacco companies has produced a global tobacco
consumption pandemic, which WHO predicts could ultimately
78
make smoking the leading cause of premature death worldwide.

71.
See World Health Organization, Review of the Constitution and Regional
Arrangements of the World Health Organization:Report of the Special Group, WHO
Doc. EB101/7 (Nov. 14, 1997). The Executive Board's resolution can be found in
Review of the Constitution of the World Health Organization:Report of the Executive
Board Special Group, WHO Doc. EB101.R2 (Jan. 22, 1998).
72.
CompareWHO CONST. art. 21, with WHO CONST. art. 19.
73.
See World Health Assembly, Revision and Updating of the International
Health Regulations,Res. WHA48.7 (May 12, 1995).
74.
See World Health Organization, The International Response to
Epidemics and Applications of the InternationalHealth Regulations:Report of a WHO
Informal Consultation, WHO Doc. WHO/EMC/IHR/96.1 (Dec. 11-14, 1995). For
analyses of the Informal Consultation's work, see Fidler, Return of the Fourth
Horseman, supra note 6, at 851-63; Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of
Infectious Diseases, supranote 56, at 1350-52.
75.
World Health Organization, International Health Regulations
(Provisional Draft) (Jan. 1998) [hereinafter IHR Provisional Draft] (on file with
author); World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health
Regulations: ProgressReport (Report by the Director-General), WHO Doc. AS 1/8,
at para. 7 (Mar. 10, 1998) [hereinafter LHR ProgressReport].
76.
See Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report,
July 1998, 73 WEEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RECORD 233, 234 (1998).
77.
See generally International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control,
supranote 53.
78.
See Taylor, Global Tobacco Control, supranote 10, at 268.
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Derek Yach of WHO recently argued that the world remains in a
phase of "selective national control but unopposed tobacco
transnational
expansion."7 9
WHO intends
the proposed
international framework convention for tobacco control to be a
key element of a global tobacco control strategy. 8 0 WHO hopes to
present a Draft International Framework Convention for Tobacco
Control at the WHA in the year 2000.81
WHO's new global health policy, Health for All in the 21 s t
Century, also contains a number of brief references to WHO's
need to use international law more than the Organization has
used it in the past.8 2 For example, the policy states that "WHO
will develop international instruments that promote and protect
health, will monitor their implementation, and will also encourage
its Member States to apply international laws related to health."8 3
The policy also shows an awareness of the importance of
international law to WHO's work on human rights, trade, and
84

environmental protection.

However, each of these initiatives to some degree builds off
the argument that globalization now forces WHO to take up the
instrument of international law. The globalization of public
health, however, is not new. The globalization of public health
caused European states to convene the long series of
International Sanitary Conferences in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. It also convinced states to negotiate
International Sanitary Conventions in the 1890s and first half of
the twentieth century. Globalization provided the basis for the
formation of international health organizations. It was the
overarching theme in the creation of innovative international legal
authority in the WHO Constitution. And the globalization of
public health exposed WHO in the late twentieth century as
historically uninterested in international law and currently
85
unprepared to undertake effective international legal initiatives.

79.
Derek Yach, Progress Toward Global Tobacco Control, presented at
Joint PAHO-WHO-NHLBI-FIC 50th Anniversary Conference on Global Shifts in
Disease Burden: The Cardiovascular Disease Pandemic, PAHO Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., May 26-28, 1998 (unpublished paper on file with author).
80.
See id.
81.
See World Health Organization, Project Proposal for the Preparationof
International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, at 3 (Jan. 1998)
[hereinafter Tobacco Convention Project Proposal] (unpublished document on file

with author).
82.
World Health Organization, Health for All in the 21st Century, WHO
Doc. A51/5 (1998).
83.
Il. at para. 52.
84.
See id. at paras. 2, 23, 25.
85.
On WHO's lack of internal international legal capabilities, see infra
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945

WHO's historical attitude towards international law is
suspect when it is examined in terms of international health law.
This attitude looks more than suspect when compared to (1)
general developments in international law post-1945, (2) how
other international organizations have used international law
since 1945, and (3) how states and international organizations
have reacted to other global problems through international law.
In Part III, this Article engages in all three comparisons to
demonstrate that WHO stands virtually alone among international
organizations in the attitude it has long held towards
international law.
A. GeneralDevelopments in InternationalLaw Since 1945
International legal historians will probably look back on the
second half of the twentieth century as the most significant era in
the history of international law. Since 1945, states, international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
transformed the scope, substance, and processes of international
law. During this time international health law stagnated, but
virtually every other area of international law underwent
significant changes.
The scope of international law has expanded significantly since
1945. Previously connected to traditional forms of state interaction,
such as diplomacy, trade, and war, international legal rules now
exist in many new, non-traditional areas, such as human rights
and environmental protection. 6 The scope of international law has
also been widened by the process of decolonization, which created
new states subject to international law where previously there had
been none. International law also was applied to new geographical
and extraterrestrial realms, as in Antarctica, the deep seabed, and
outer space.
The substance of international law has changed as well. The
development of international human rights law shattered the
traditional conception that only states were subjects of
international law. Making individuals subjects of international law
fundamentally shifted the international legal paradigm away from
a state-centric view to a more dynamic perspective that looks not
only at the state but also through the state to grant individual

86.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
816, 838-42 (1997) (discussing the difference between traditional customary

international law and new, non-traditional customary international law on human
rights).
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citizens rights under international law. The emergence of
developing countries also affected the substance of international
law by bringing non-European, non-affluent perspectives to
international legal rules. Developing states championed new
international legal rules in international economics, supported the
right of self-determination, developed the concept of the common
heritage of mankind, and launched the effort that produced a
87
comprehensive reformulation of the law of the sea.
The processes of making, implementing, and enforcing
international law have also undergone significant change since
1945. While much of international law was customary
international law prior to 1945, the period since then has seen
the treaty dominate the process of international law-making. In
addition, much international law-making now takes place in
multilateral fora rather than in traditional bilateral diplomacy.
Thus, the role of international organizations in making
international law has grown.88 A similar growth has taken place
in connection with NGOs, which are increasingly involved in
making, implementing, and enforcing compliance with rules of
89
international law.
Further, certain challenges have produced new types of
international legal processes, most famously the frameworkprotocol approach used in international environmental law. In
fact, it is the framework-protocol approach that WHO adopted in
proposing an international framework convention for tobacco
control. 90 Arguments have been made for using the same
approach in connection with infectious diseases. 9 1
Finally, there has been a growth in the number of entities
created to interpret rules of international law in cases of disputes.
Along with the ICJ, which had a pre-World War II predecessor in
the Permanent Court of International Justice, international law
witnessed the development of the European Court of Justice, the

87.
See Ian Brownlie The Expansion of International Society: The
Consequencesfor the Law of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
357, 367 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984) (noting many Third World
initiatives in international law) [hereinafter Brownlie, The Expansion of

InternationalSociety].
88.
See Jonathan Chamey, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529, 529 (1993).
89.
See generally Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The
Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997) (arguing that NGOs have established themselves as
important actors in international relations).
90.
See Taylor, Global Tobacco Control, supra note 10, at 292-98
(discussing framework-protocol approach in tobacco context).
91.
See FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supranote 26,
at ch. 9; Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 864-67.
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European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, dispute resolution panels under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and
the proposed International Criminal Court.
Ironically, while significant changes to international law
occurred in the post-1945 period, international health law
developed new scope, substance, and processes before 1945.

Driven by the nature of the microbial world, international health
law gradually increased its scope, moving away from the
European core to the periphery. In addition, states drafted
international legal rules for human, animal, and plant disease
situations. 92 The substantive nature of the rules also changed,
from primarily rules aimed at quarantine harmonization to rules
setting up a surveillance and control system. The WHO
Constitution, finally, established new processes for the creation of
international health law. The promise of these changes, however,
did not materialize. During history's greatest transformation of
general international law, the harsh truth is that international
law dropped off the agenda of global public health. International
health law played no role, had no influence on, and was not
influenced by the greatest changes ever seen in international law.
B. InternationalOrganizationsand InternationalLaw
The framers of WHO clearly intended the Organization to play a
catalytic role in the development of international health law-a role
WHO subsequently refused to play. 93 During the same period,
however, other international organizations with similar or even less
international legal authority than WHO developed international law
in their respective areas. These international organizations have been
engines of international legal development both inside and outside
the United Nations system. For example, Taylor has identified the
International Maritime Organization and the United Nations
Environmental Programme as examples of multilateral organizations
that have been successful in promoting international law in their
respective areas. 94 Taylor's insight can be applied to a number of
different international areas, including international human rights,

international labor law, international civil aviation law, international

92.
See supraPart II.A.
93.
See supraPart II.C.
94.
See Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work, supra note 5,
at 333-35.
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intellectual property law, the law of the sea, international
telecommunications law, and international economic law.
The growth in importance of international organizations in
the development of international law is apparent with regards to
both treaty law and customary international law. International
organizations have been the source for many treaty initiatives
since World War II and have really become the major source of
multilateral treaty development in the modem international
system. Although the United Nations and most of its specialized
agencies have played a dominant role in this regard, the
phenomenon is also apparent with regional international
organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization
of American States. In connection with customary international
law, international lawyers and tribunals frequently rely on the
practices of international organizations in finding and analyzing
state practice and opinio juris. In addition, the treaty role that
international organizations have played affects analysis of
customary international law as international lawyers and
tribunals locate state practice in state parties' behavior under
multilateral treaties.
WHO again stands in contrast to these general trends in the
development of international law by international organizations.
WHO itself has not utilized its treaty-making authority and has
shown no interest in customary international law as a source of
international law on public health. Further, WHO has not been
keen to involve itself in the development of other international
legal regimes created by other U.N. specialized agencies or other
international organizations that directly affect its mandate (i.e.,
environmental protection and human rights).
C. InternationalLaw and Global Problems
Another way to analyze WHO's use of international law is to
consider how states and international organizations address
global problems.
As the history of international health
cooperation suggests, preserving and maintaining public health
requires international cooperation.
As early as the midnineteenth century, states realized that the protection of public
health required multilateral cooperation because the threat to
public health was beyond the unilateral power of any state.
Similarly, dealing with environmental degradation is also a global
problem that demands international cooperation. Experts often
argue that environmental problems like trade in endangered
species, trade in hazardous wastes, acid rain, ozone depletion,
marine pollution, destruction of biodiversity, desertification, and
global warming cannot be handled by any single state or bilateral
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agreement but only through multilateral cooperation across the
entire international system. 95
In addition, both global health and global environmental
problems involve setting international standards or objectives that
states must implement domestically. As in the development of
international health law, states established standards for
surveillance and quarantine measures through international law;
international legal rules then had to be implemented in each
country through domestic law. The same dynamic operates
throughout international environmental diplomacy: standards or
objectives are set internationally and carried out domestically.
International health law and international environmental law also
both involve serious complications caused by economic gaps
between developed and developing countries. The public health
gap
between developed
and developing
countries
has
tremendously affected WHO's activities throughout its existence. 96
Likewise, the tension between the North and South over tradeoffs
between environmental protection and economic development
haunt international environmental diplomacy and international
97
environmental law.
Finally, both international health law and international
environmental law rely on science for guidance. Science proved the
catalyst for the development of international health law and the
formation of international health organizations. International legal
rules designed to control infectious diseases, for example, begin with
the measures scientific principles recommend for dealing with
pathogenic microbes. 9 8 In international environmental law, science
has also been a catalyst as research showed the environmental and
health harms caused by pollution and exploitation of natural
resources.
While public health concerns and environmental degradation
are analogous global problems, each issue has been addressed
through international law in a completely different manner. As
previously noted, WHO has done virtually nothing to develop

95.

See Owen Greene, Environmental Issues, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF

WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 313, 314 (John

Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997) (noting that "many environmental problems are
intrinsically transnational, in that by their nature they cross state boundaries").
96.
See, e.g., CHARLES 0. PANNENBORG, A NEW INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORDER:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF WORLD HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE

80-176 (1979) (analyzing the gap between developed and developing countries in
health).
97.
Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the
Environment:An Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1,

37-44 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (discussing problems
created in the environmental context between developed and developing states),
98.

See INT'L HEALTH REG., supranote 55.
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international
health
law. 99
By comparison,
international
environmental law has exploded in the last thirty years into one of
the most important and rich areas in international law. Since the
early 1970s, states have concluded hundreds of international
environmental instruments.1 0 0 Given the similar natures of the
global public health and environmental problems, the drastic
difference in how international law has been used to address
these problems again places WHO's attitude towards international
law into question.

IV. EXPLAINING WHO'S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BEHAVIOR

WHO's ambivalence towards international health law described
in Parts II and III of this Article requires explanation when it is
compared to and contrasted with other international legal

developments after 1945. The explanation is, not surprisingly,
complex. Constructing an explanation also partially counteracts the
criticism of WHO's behavior contained in Part II and Part III.
The common argument used to explain WHO's antipathy
towards international law is that WHO is dominated almost

exclusively by people trained in public health and medicine, which

produces an ethos that looks at global health problems as medicaltechnical issues to be resolved by the application of the healing
arts.101 This argument is commonly made because it explains a great

deal of WHO's attitude towards international law. The medicaltechnical approach does not need international law because the
approach mandates application of the medical or technical resource
or answer directly at the national or local level.
General criticism of WHO's performance over the last twenty
years frequently hones in on the medical-technical ethos issue. 102

99.
See supraPart II.C.
100. See Edith Brown Weiss, InternationalEnvironmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order,81 GEO. L.J. 675, 675 (1993).
101. See Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work, supranote 5,
at 336 (noting that WHO's "officials are largely a specialized, professional circle of
physicians, scientists, and public health specialists").
102. See Gill Walt, International Organizations in Health: The Problem of
Leadership, in POCANTIco RETREAT: ENHANCING THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 23, 25 (1996) (arguing that the WHO "remains dominated by
medical professionals. Critical masses of nurses, economists, and social scientists
have been conspicuously absent"); Godlee, WHO in Crisis, supranote 2, at 1425,
1426 (arguing that WHO has been slow to respond to the increasingly
multisectoral nature of health and has retreated into its traditional technicalmedical approach under Director-General Nakajima); Fiona Godlee, WHO in
Retreat: Is it Losing Its Influence?, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 1491, 1494 (1994) ("The lack
of clear policy is aggravated by WHO's failure to relinquish its hold on the
traditional medical model of health."); Fiona Godlee, WHO Reform and Global
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The globalization of public health makes WHO's mission
inherently multifaceted, demanding much more than a clinical
approach to health problems. The WHO has begun to realize the
multidisciplinary challenge it faces as demonstrated by its recent
argument for an intersectoral strategy to achieve the objective of
health for all. 103
While helpful, the medical-technical ethos argument is not
sufficient to explain WHO's attitude towards international law.
Two other factors that support the medical-technical ethos
argument need to be mentioned. First, the medical-technical
ethos developed in the wake of scientific progress against
infectious diseases. The medical-technical ethos reflects the
confidence that science had engendered in the public health and
medical professions in the first few decades following World War
II. WHO's founding coincided with the beginning of the antibiotic
revolution, which altered the balance of power in the struggle with
infectious diseases in the favor of humanity. When public health
benefits are perceived to flow from application of the fruits of
modem public health, medicine, and science, those practicing the
healing art naturally focus on applying those fruits directly and
expansively. From this understandable perspective, international
law has only indirect relevance in that it provides the
international organizational framework that allows public health
officials and doctors to ease human suffering.
The importance of scientific progress in the dominance of the
medical-technical ethos at WHO also relates to the role of science
in the development of international health law. Science was
important in the development of international health law in the
1890s because it provided the breakthrough knowledge needed to
10 4
allow states to finally agree to some common rules of behavior.
The scientific progress of the antibiotic revolution had the
opposite effect on international health law because such progress
allowed public health officials to go directly after the pathogenic

Health Radical Restructuring is the Only Way Ahead, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 1359,
1360 (1997) (arguing that WHO "should incorporate a broader mix of skills and
move away from the narrow biomedical model of the current organisation"); John
W. Peabody, An Organizational Analysis of the World Health Organization:
Narrowing the Gap Between Promise and Performance,40 Soc. SCI. & MED. 731,
739 (1995) (arguing that "[e]mploying staff which only draw from the public health
and medical culture limits the technical capacity of the Organization").
103. See World Health Organization, Intersectoral Action for Health: A
Cornerstone for Health for All in the Twenty-First Century-Report of the
International Conference, Apr. 20-23, 1997, WHO Doc. WHO/PPE/PAC/97.6;
Health for All in the 21st Century, supra note 82, at Boxes 2, 7 (emphasizing
intersectoral approaches to health).
104. See FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supranote 24,
at ch. 2.
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microbes rather than thinking about international legal regimes
designed to contain diseases. Critics of WHO have complained
about the prevalence of "eradicationitis" at WHO that is based on
WHO's successful eradication of smallpox.10 5 For those committed
to eradicating-as opposed to controlling-diseases, international
law may seem unnecessary because eradication is a medical-

technical challenge.
In addition, it is misleading to conclude that public health
and environmental protection are similar in nature because both
rely on science. While science has directly and dramatically
affected the process and substance of international health law,
science does not play nearly as central a role in international
environmental diplomacy because many environmental problems
10 6
have often been surrounded by scientific controversy.
International health law waxed after the development of scientific
certainty on germ theory and waned after the development of
10 7
scientific certainty that antimicrobials are effective treatments.
A great deal of international environmental diplomacy takes place
against the backdrop of scientific uncertainty, as evidenced by the
controversies raging about the "science" of global warming.
As general criticisms of WHO's medical-technical ethos
suggest, WHO's penchant for looking at global health as a clinical
issue has proved ill-advised; but the steady advances of science
gave physicians and public health experts powerful healing tools
that they wished to apply globally. Science became a two-edged
sword: advancing the healing art to ever higher effectiveness but
gradually clouding from the picture the ongoing evolutionary
processes in the microbial world and the economic, social, and
political problems behind much human disease. The antibiotic
revolution allowed many people to forget that pathogenic microbes
would respond to pressures placed on them by human
pharmaceuticals and to believe that drugs would permanently
hold infectious diseases at bay. The developing crisis of
antimicrobial resistance in many pathogens has reawakened
people to the evolutionary powers of the microbial world and to
the dangers of relying heavily on drugs to combat infectious

105. See Fiona Godlee, WHO's Special Programmes: Undermining from
Above, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 178, 181 (1995) (noting that "eradicationitis remains

highly prevalent within [the] WHO" despite many failures to eradicate diseases);
see also Peabody, supranote 102, at 736 (discussing the importance of smallpox
eradication to narrative myths of the WHO).
106.

See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMAcY 64-68 (1994).

107. See Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health, supra note 10, at 29
(arguing that "the national interest of developed states in the international control
of infectious diseases was weakened by the impact, and perceived future impact,
of adequate public health systems and antimicrobial pharmaceuticals").
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diseases. 108 In addition, literature on emerging infectious diseases
attributes new and returning disease threats to many underlying
political, economic, and social changes and problems, such as a
breakdown in public health infrastructures, social unrest and
civil war, environmental degradation, changes in human
behavior, urbanization, and poverty.' 0 9 Recognition of these

various factors shows that public health in the global era
represents far more than a medical-technical challenge.
Scientific progress, especially in connection with infectious
disease control, has had another negative consequence for the

pursuit of global public health. With new, powerful tools at hand
to address infectious diseases, whether indigenous or imported,
developed states gradually lost interest in infectious disease
control as an important element of interstate relations. 110 As
infectious disease control became less important to developed
states as part of their international relations, international health
law and organizations suffered, weakening infectious disease
control as an objective of international society.' 1 1
The second factor that augments the medical-technical ethos
is the tension existing between voluntary compliance and
compulsory compliance mandated by law. Public health experts
argue that voluntary compliance provides a stronger basis for
public health measures than legal compulsion. 1 12 When this
argument is applied to international health cooperation, the

108. On antimicrobial resistance, see generally World Health Organization,
Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases: Antimicrobial Resistance, Report by
the Director-General,WHO Doc. A51/9 (Mar. 10, 1998). See also World Health
Assembly, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases: Antimicrobial Resistance,
Res. WHAS1.17 (May 16, 1998); ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

(Workshop Report from the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Emerging Infections)
(P.F. Harrison & J. Lederberg eds., 1998); STUART B. LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC
PARADOx: How MIRACLE DRUGS ARE DESTROYING THE MIRACLE (1992); David P.

Fidler, Legal Challenges Posed by the use of Antimicrobials in Food Animal
Production, 1 MICROBES AND INFECTION (1999) (forthcoming Jan. 1999) [hereinafter

Fidler, Legal Challenges]; David P. Fidler, Legal Issues Associated with
AntimicrobialDrug Resistance, supranote 6, at 169.
See Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman, supra note 6, at 788-8 10
109.
(discussing these factors contributing to the emergence and reemergence of
infectious diseases).
See Fidler, Microbialpolitik,supranote 13, at 12-13; see also Fidler, The
110.
Globalization of PublicHealth, supra note 10, at 26-30 (discussing how developed
countries lost interest in international infectious disease control during most of
the twentieth century).
Fidler, Microbialpolitik, supranote 13, at 25-26.
111.
112.
See David P. Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious
Diseases: Challengesfor International National, and State Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 773,
786-87 (1997) ("Disease prevention cannot rely on legal coercion. In the vast
majority of cases, epidemiologists depend upon education and persuasion to
secure voluntary compliance with their recommendations.").
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difficulties with law-based duties multiply because of the
structure of the international system, making voluntary
compliance the key approach. Following such a strategy may seem
to make developing international health law for public health
purposes unnecessary. Where legal compulsion is necessary, it is
more effectively applied by a government against a citizen under
domestic law than by WHO against a government under
international law. WHO's long-standing publication of national
public health legislation suggests that WHO has preferred to
stress the importance of national health law over international
3
health law. 11
These explanations of WHO's lack of interest in international
law have a certain logic and plausibility. The explanations may
assist understanding some of WHO's behavior in the post-1945
period. These explanations, however, do not vindicate WHO's
behavior: the medical-technical ethos has damaged not only
WHO's interest in international law but also the entire mission of
the Organization. As the global crisis in emerging infectious
diseases demonstrates, the medical-technical approach has failed
and has left WHO relatively unprepared to deal with a crisis that
cannot be resolved by the mere application of scientific advances.
In fact, emerging infectious diseases and other global health
problems may make the current situation more akin to the
international situation in the earlier parts of this century than to
the golden age of WHO's medical-technical ethos. In other words,
we need international law to have a role in global public health.

V.

WOULD INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE?

While the case against WHO's historical attitude towards
international law is powerful, one might ask whether global public
health would really be better off today if WHO had been actively
engaged in
international law.11 4
This question
could be

113.
Article 63 of the WHO Constitution requires each Member State to
"communicate promptly to the Organization important laws, regulations, official
reports and statistics pertaining to health which have been published in the State
concerned." WHO CONST. art. 63. The WHO publishes items received under
Article 63 in the InternationalDigest of Health Legislation. For a historical analysis
of WHO's involvement with disseminating information about national health
legislation, see generally S. S. Fluss, The Role of WHO in Health Legislation: Some
HistoricalPerspectives,49 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEG. 113 (1998).
114.
See, e.g., Taylor, Globalization and Public Health, supra note 5, at 4
("Although the development and implementation of cogent national and
international public health law can make an important contribution to global
health, there is good reason for a healthy skepticism about the capacity of
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considerably sharpened by noting that a great deal of the

international legal revolution of the post-1945 period is sound
and fury, not signifying much. In many areas, there is a large gap
between what international lawyers say are the rules of

international law and what states actually do in practice. In this
respect, non-compliance with the IHR is no different from noncompliance with international human rights law. International

environmental law may have exploded, but has the explosion
really made a significant impact on global environmental
degradation? Similarly, if WHO had developed international law
for public health purposes, would a larger body of ignored norms
One might reasonably
have improved global public health?
suspect that it would not.
This line of reasoning also leads to an examination of the
reality of WHO's innovative international legal authority. While
perhaps unprecedented for its time, the innovation may also have
been too far ahead of its time. WHO Member States may have
been reluctant to utilize the treaty and regulation powers because
of the burdens placed on their sovereignty. 115 Perhaps the
political commitment from the Member States to make WHO
active in international law was simply lacking. Absent that
commitment, WHO might be considered handicapped in
developing an international legal strategy. The same debilitating
dynamic may be at work in connection with the proposed
international framework convention for tobacco control. Yach
notes that "[global intentions to control1 6tobacco, however, have
not been matched by financial support."

The above discussion raises a more general skepticism about
international law. To many people, international law is a weak
institution in international relations that usually promises more
than it delivers. Such skepticism is often expressed in sentiments
such as "international law is not really law" or "international law
is just morality because its rules cannot be enforced." These
sentiments most often flow from a realist outlook on international
relations. Realism focuses on states and their power as the
such a world view leaves
driving focus of international relations;
1 17
little or no room for international law.
These arguments from hard-headed realism have a seductive
force, but they lead us to ask the wrong questions. Realism as a
theoretical foundation for understanding the globalization of
public health has very limited utility because its focus on states,
international organization to alter state behavior and encourage the codification
and implementation of effective national and international legal instruments.").
115. See Fidler, Return of the FourthHorseman, supranote 6, at 838.
116. See Yach, supranote 79, at abstract.
117. See Fidler, The Globalizationof PublicHealth, supranote 10, at 38.

19981

THE FUTURE OF THE WHO

1105

power, and anarchy marginalizes the types of challenges posed by
global health problems. 11 8 Realism remains relevant, however, by
providing a skeptical voice about the potential for international
cooperation on global health issues." 9 While it is important to

emphasize that any WHO international legal strategy (had one
been formed) would have faced serious political obstacles, the
existence of those obstacles would not have been a reason for
international legal paralysis. Although it is necessary to stress
that international law often has limited effectiveness, the
inevitable gap between expectations and reality has not been a
reason to abandon international law as an instrument of global
policy development. Despite political obstacles and less than
hoped for achievements, the development of international law
carries with it important messages that become part of the
landscape of international relations.
We can turn the tables on our original question-whether
global public health would be better off today if WHO had actively
utilized international law-by asking whether world health would
be worse off today if WHO had developed international health law
and had been sensitive to the developments in international law
in other areas. Moreover, if this query is placed in a less
hypothetical framework, one could ask, for example, whether the
treatment of individuals by their governments would be worse
today without the body of international human rights law. Or, do
we prefer to have international environmental law of questionable
efficacy or no international environmental law at all? Perhaps the
most lasting achievement of human rights and international
environmental law, and other areas of international law, is not so
much the compliance record of states but the normative
framework these bodies of international law provide in their
respective areas. International law can be used to construct
legitimate
expectations
and to transform
discourse
in
international relations. These lessons about international law's
role in international relations are taught by international relations

theories other than realism, such as regime theory and liberalism.
Constructing legitimate expectations and transforming discourse
are also important functions of international law that WHO has so
far failed to appreciate in connection with the role of international
law in its work.
Those who knowingly or unknowingly accept realism's
premises about international relations and international law in
the area of global public health forget or ignore that health

118. See id. at 37-41 (analyzing realism in connection with the globalization
of public health).
119. See id. at 40.
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threats like emerging infectious diseases and tobacco-related
diseases challenge and undermine traditional concepts of the
state and sovereignty. 120 With a global germ pool, there can be no
such thing as a balance of power in public health terms. The
meaning of a "sovereign state" changes because the globalization
of public health undermines a state's ability to provide for its
public's health. Although sovereignty still frustrates efforts to
create international health cooperation, 12 1 the nature of most
global health threats combined with the structure of the
international system inevitably creates the need for international
cooperation and international law. 122
Even admitting, for argument's sake, that WHO Member

States would never have developed international health law more
than they actually did, the need for sensitivity to international law
goes beyond the creation of more international health law. It
includes being aware of, and playing an active role in, the
development of other areas of international law. WHO officials are
very good, and have been for decades, at stressing how
interdependent the world is when it comes to health. One might
think that because health cuts across many, if not all, aspects of
international relations, WHO would prove to be sensitive to, and
actively engaged in, international legal issues touching on health.
But such a thought would be grossly incorrect. WHO has
demonstrated no interest in the general developments of
international law unless global disease problems compel it to
consider international law.
Finally, arguing that global health would not be much better
off today even if WHO had fully engaged the use of international
law misunderstands the nature of the inquiry. WHO's
ambivalence towards international law was not the result of a
formal position adopted at WHO's inception in 1948. Accordingly,
analysis should focus on actual developments rather than
hypothetical "would have been" arguments. WHO's Legal Counsel
did argue in 1989 that international law was not a useful
instrument for dealing with global health problems because
health problems moved too quickly while international legal
machinery moved too slowly. 123 WHO's Legal Counsel made this

120. See id. at 38.
121. See Fidler, Globalization, InternationalLaw, supranote 6, at 83.
122. See id. at 79.
123. Vignes, supra note 49, at 18 ("The use of binding mechanisms would
seem unrealistic. Leaving aside conventions, for which the future promises no
more than the past, resort to regulations appears a very doubtful
undertaking.... The real difficulty is that measures cannot be adopted quickly
enough to meet the health requirements of the moment.").
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argument specifically with the AIDS pandemic in mind. 12 4
Ironically, at the same time that the Legal Counsel advocated this
position, WHO was embracing international human rights law as
the paradigm for dealing with HIV/AIDS. 125 Presently, the Legal
Counsel's position has been undermined by the growing
realization at the Organization that perhaps international law is
needed as global health problems accelerate in speed and increase

in volume.
The position expressed by WHO's Legal Counsel about
international law in connection with the HIV/AIDS pandemic
raises the need to think about the nature and purpose of
international law. Looking at international law through realism's
lenses produces an attitude that limits both the practical effect
and normative value of international law. In the future, WHO
should more openly look at international law as a resource that
provides tremendous practical and normative benefits for the
pursuit of global public health. International law serves WHO's
mandate because it is the institution of international relations in
which WHO's existence and architecture are grounded. Through
international law, WHO can pursue projects necessary to promote
world health and attempt to transform the landscape of
international relations on public health.

VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WHO's FUTURE
A. The PresentSituation: An InternationalLegal Tsunami
When contemplating WHO's future and the role international
law should play in it, it is important to understand first how
international law currently relates to WHO's mission. The current
situation reveals that WHO faces an international legal tsunami
because of the many areas of international law that directly affect
WHO's work as an international health organization. 1 2 6 A
complete catalog of all the important elements of international law
that affect WHO's efforts is beyond the scope of this Article, 12 7 but

124.
See id.
125.
See Katarina Tomasevski et al., AIDS and Human Rights, in AIDS AND
THE WORLD I 537, 568 (Jonathan M. Mann, et al. eds., 1992) ("The global
response to AIDS included an emphasis on human rights from the very
beginning.")
126.
See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
127.
See Fidler, The Role of International Law, supranote 6, at 64-66
(discussing the relevance of international trade law, international human rights
law, international environmental law, and international law on biological weapons
to the global fight against infectious diseases).
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this section can at least provide a glimpse of the international
legal challenges now facing WHO.
First, one has to start by looking at specific international
legal initiatives of WHO: the revised IHR and the proposed
international framework convention for tobacco control. These

initiatives address two of the greatest global health problems
facing WHO, and thus are very important projects. 128 These
problems, standing alone, present significant international legal
burdens requiring serious human and financial resources, but
they are only the beginning.
International legal challenges will come WHO's way if certain
provisions in the proposed revision of the IHR remain. WHO has
proposed to establish a Committee of Arbitration to settle disputes
between Member States over the interpretation or application of
the IHR. 12 9 Thus, WHO has, quite radically, proposed its own
dispute settlement body that would engage in making
international legal decisions and which would develop its own
body of "case law." As a result, WHO would become involved in
interpreting the IHR and thus would find itself in the realm of
treaty interpretation under the rules embodied in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Treaty interpretation is
commonplace for the ICJ or for dispute settlement panels of the
WTO, but not historically for any significant part of WHO's
activities. In addition, the Committee of Arbitration would have to
devise procedural rules to ensure that the Member States receive
fair treatment in the proceedings, which is also beyond WHO's
historical experiences. The Committee of Arbitration would
perhaps also have to confront issues involving fact-finding and
standards of review for national governmental decisions under the
IHR. All this will require international legal capabilities that WHO
has not previously thought important to develop. The IHR
Provisional Draft suggests that WHO has not even started to think
about the many international legal challenges the Committee of
Arbitration would create; the annex that is to spell out the details
130
was not drafted for the IHR Provisional Draft.
In connection with the proposed international framework
convention for tobacco control, the framework-protocol approach
will demand ongoing, systemic international legal effort from

128.

See Hiroshi Nakajima, Message from the Director-General, in WORLD

HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1997: CONQUERING SUFFERING,

ENRICHING HuMANITy at v (1997) ("In the battle for health in the 21st century,
infectious diseases and chronic diseases are twin enemies that have to be fought
simultaneously on a global scale.").
129.
See IHR Provisional Draft, supra note 75, at art. 56.
130.
See id. at annex ix ("Annex IX-Committee of Arbitration-to be

prepared").
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WHO for the strategy to succeed. Treaty interpretation problems
would arise with the framework convention and any protocols just
as such problems arise under any international agreement. Once
the framework convention is in place, WHO will have to continue
to push for the development of protocols to fill out the
international legal regime on tobacco control. A fundamental
rationale behind a framework-protocol approach is to create an
international legal dynamic that operates permanently, but WHO
has to commit time, personnel, and resources to embed such a
dynamic not only into the spirit of WHO but also into its day-today activities. It is perhaps telling that in its Project Proposal for
the Preparation of the International Framework Convention for
Tobacco Control the WHO includes nothing beyond the adoption
of the convention by the WHA. 13 1 Moreover, nothing in WHO's
history suggests that it is prepared to undertake such a long-term
process of international legal development.
Second, as previously noted, Healthfor All in the 213t Century
indicates that WHO should begin to develop international health

law more actively. 13 2 Increasing WHO's international legal activity
beyond the revised IHR and the tobacco control convention will
demand even more international legal commitment from WHO.
The Healthfor All in the 21st Century policy does not specifically
mention areas of WHO's activities that require international legal
attention, 3 3 but literature on the subject points to a few areas:
(1) standards on the safety, purity, and potency of biological,
pharmaceutical, and similar products flowing in international
commerce, and on the international trade in blood and human
135
organs;' 3 4 (2) international regulations on xenotransplantation;
3 6
(3) rules to curb the misuse of antimicrobials;1
(4) rules on
health information and sales of health products and services over

131.
See Tobacco Convention ProjectProposal,supranote 81.
132.
HealthforAllin the 21st Century, supranote 82, at para. 52.
133.
See generally id.
134.
See Katarina Tomasevski, Health, in 2 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORD. 859,
882-89 (Oscar Schacter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (discussing
pharmaceutical safety and trade in human blood and organs).
135.
See Review of the Constitution and Regional Arrangements of the World
Health Organization, supra note 71, at 6 (recommending Article 21 powers for
setting standards on transplantation of tissues).
136.
See The Medical Impact of the Use of Antimicrobials in Food Animals:
Report of a WHO Meeting, Berlin, Germany, 13-17 October 1997, WHO Doc.
WHO/EMC/ZOO/97.4, at 9 ("On the international level, agreements are needed
to reduce the risk of transmitting resistance between countries."); Fidler, Legal
Challenges, supra note 108 (arguing the international legal rules to deal with
resistance problems generated by the use of antimicrobials in food animal
production); Fidler, Legal Issues Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Resistance,
supra note 6, at 172 (arguing for international legal rules to deal with

antimicrobial drug misuse).
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the Internet;1 3 7 and (5) diverse issues arising from the link
between international trade and health (e.g., tobacco, alcohol,
food safety, and the relationship of intellectual property
protections to pharmaceuticals).
Third, WHO has to pay more attention to the many and
diverse areas of international law that relate to its global health
mission. These areas include, but are not limited to: (1)
international trade law, (2) international human rights law, (3)
international environmental law, (4) international law on
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, (5) international
maritime law, (6) international labor law, (7) international civil
aviation law, (8) the law of the sea, (9) international
telecommunications law, (10) international humanitarian law, (11)
international intellectual property law, and (12) international law
on bioethics. The revolutionary changes in international law since
1945 can clearly be seen in this list. In addition, the list
demonstrates that WHO's policy of ignoring other areas of
international law has been a serious mistake.
One of the most important bodies of international law
touching on the WHO's activities is international trade law. The
and
WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)13 8 directly affects
WHO's work with the Food and Agricultural Organization because
of the role that the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius now
play in international trade law.13 9 More generally, the importance
of international standards, guidelines, and recommendations in
the SPS Agreement and other WTO agreements, such as the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), could
place many WHO recommendations and guidelines directly into
the realm of international legal discourse and action. 140

137.
See concerns raised in Cross-BorderAdvertising, Promotion and Sale of
Medical Products Using the Internet, WHA, Res. WHA50.4 (May 12, 1997). See also
Cross-Border Advertising, Promotion and Sale of Medical Products Using the
Internet, WHA, Res. WHA51.9 (May 16, 1998).
138. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Dec. 15, 1993, MTN/FA II-AlA-4 (1994).
See generally discussion in Fidler, Trade and Health, supra note 7, at
139.
321-22.
140.
See generally Fidler, Legal Issues Associated with Antimicrobial Drug
Resistance, supranote 6, at 173 (discussing Codex's Code of Practice for Control
of the Use of Veterinary Drugs and Guidelines for the Establishment of a

Regulatory Programme for Control of Veterinary Drug Residues in Food as
intemational standards in the fight against drug resistance); Colette Kinnon,
World Trade: Bringing Health into the Picture, 19 WORLD HEALTH F. 397 (1998)
(discussing the possibility that WHO standards on pharmaceuticals moving in
international commerce could be used by WTO dispute settlement panels in

disputes under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade).
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For example, this Author has challenged the European
Union's ban on fresh fish imports from cholera-stricken East
African countries as violative of both the IHR and the SPS
Agreement. 14 1 The SPS Agreement argument relies on WHO's
Guidelines for Cholera Control, and maintains that the European
Union's import ban was not based on relevant international
standards nor was it supported by risk assessment or scientific
evidence. 142 Similar international legal use could be made of
WHO's standards, guidelines, and recommendations on other
topics, such as the safety of biologicals and pharmaceuticals. The
linkage between the SPS Agreement and WHO standards,

guidelines, and recommendations changes the environment in
which WHO will adopt such measures in the future. The linkage
has already affected the Codex process for setting food safety
standards, 14 and recent revisions to the International Plant
Protection Convention were made expressly to prepare its
standards for use in SPS Agreement disputes.144
Other important aspects of the WTO regime are also of direct
relevance to the WHO, namely: (1) how the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) will affect
the global pharmaceutical market; (2) how the TBT Agreement will
affect technical standards for health products; and (3) how the
General Agreement on Trade in Services will affect transnational
5
provision of health services.14
For an international organization that has not developed any
serious internal international legal capabilities, the international
legal challenges WHO now confronts must seem like an
unmanageable international legal tsunami. The immediate task

141.
See David P. Fidler, Postings on ProMED-mail, under subject heading
Cholera, Impact on Commercial Fishing-E. Africa (Jan. 13 and Jan. 17, 1998)

(on file with author).
142. WHO's Director-General stated in connection with the European
Union's import ban that "the placing of embargoes on the importation of food
such as seafood, fresh water fish and vegetables is not an appropriate course of
action to prevent the international spread of cholera. . . " Director-GeneralSays
Food Import Bans Are Inappropriatefor Fighting Cholera, WHO Press Release

WHO/24 (Feb. 16, 1998).
143.
See Fidler, Trade and Health, supra note 7, at 325 (discussing the
impact of the SPS Agreement on the Codex process).
144.
See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
InternationalPlant Protection Ready for the New Century (last modified Jan. 30,
1998) <http://vwv.fao.org/NEWS/1998/980106-e.htm>.
145.
See also Measuring Trade LiberalizationAgainst PublicHealth Objectives:
The Case of Health Services, WHO Doc. WHO/TFHE/TBN/97.2 (1997); The
Uruguay Round and Drugs, WHO Doc. WHO/TFHE/97.1 (1997); WTO: What's In It
for WHO?, WHO Doc. WHO/TRHE/95.5 (1995). See generally Kinnon, supra note
140.
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for the future is to build up WHO's international legal capabilities
so that it can begin to face these challenges.
B. The Future: A Sea Change Required
At present, WHO does not have any permanent or part-time
staff members that have primary responsibility for matters of
public international law. 14 6 The Legal Counsel's Office is already

overburdened with day-to-day legal matters and the functioning
147
This lack of internal
of the Executive Board and WHA.
international legal capacity must be addressed. This proposition

will elicit groans of protest from those familiar with WHO's
financial problems. 148 Spend precious resources on international

lawyers?
The Author answers this question affirmatively because, as
argued in this Article, WHO should take international law more

seriously in the future. However, the task of building internal
international legal capacity faces the same financial constraints
as all other existing or desired WHO programs. Thus, building
international legal capacity has to be approached creatively to
overcome the problems created by financial constraints.

146. Interviews with WHO staff members, March 1998. See also Taylor,
Globalization and Public Health, supra note 5, at 14 ("Currently, there is no
specific unit or division at WHO, or even attorneys within any particular division,
with the specific mandate to work on the elaboration of national and international
health norms.").
147. Interviews with WHO staff members, March 1998.
148. See Leon Gordenker, The World Health Organization:Sectoral Leader or
Occasional Benefactor?, in U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167,
176 (Roger A. Coate ed., 1994) ("The reluctance of WHO member states to provide
increased funding places real constraints on the organization's ability to fund its
broad agenda of health activities."). In 1997, the World Health Assembly
expressed its "concern at the increasingly large number of Members that have
been in arrears in the payment of their contributions in recent years to an extent

which would justify invoking Article 7 of the Constitution and the unprecedented
level of contributions owed by them." Members in Arrears in the Payment of Their
Contributionsto an Extent Which Would Justify Invoking Article 7 of the Constitution,
WHA, Res. WHA50.8 (May 12, 1997). Under Article 7 of the WHO Constitution,
the WHA can "suspend voting privileges and services to which a Member is
entitled" if a Member States "fails to meet its financial obligations to the
Organization or in other exceptional circumstances." WHO CONST. art. 7. Similar
financial concerns were expressed by the WHA in 1998. See Members in Arrears in
the Payment of Their Contributionsto an Extent Which Would Justify Invoking Article
7 of the Constitution, WHA, Res. WHA51.2 (May 12, 1998); see also Status of
Collection of Assessed Contributions: Report by the Director-General, WHO Doc.
A51/13 (May 8, 1998) (reporting that the percentage of collection of assessed
contributions of the Member States for the first four months of 1998 "is the lowest
in the past 10 years for that period of time").
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Despite financial concerns, the task of building international
legal capacity in WHO will require allocations from WHO's regular
budget to fund the development and maintenance of a core
international legal effort at WHO. 14 9 A WHO international legal
office should be able to service the needs of WHO staff members
working on diverse global health questions. In addition, such an
office also needs to work closely with the Director-General's office
in using international law to help shape the practical and
normative agenda of WHO. Given that the functions of the
proposed international legal office differ significantly from those of
the existing Legal Counsel's Office, the former should not be
housed within the latter, although coordination between the two
would be required. Ideally, the international legal office would sit
within or directly under the Director-General's office to assure the
integration of international law with all WHO policy.
Funding for a WHO international legal office should come
from WHO's regular budget, but it would also be possible for WHO
to seek extra-budgetary funds from Member States as is often
done in financing WHO programs. Member States could provide
direct monetary assistance or send trained lawyers to work with
WHO international legal office. Clearly, such extra-budgetary
support carries with it dangers, for Member States may attempt
to influence international legal efforts or the interpretation of
WHO's mandate. However, given the reality of regular WHO
finances, it may prove necessary to solicit extra-budgetary funds.
In financing an international legal office, WHO should also
tap into potential support from private foundations, which could
provide direct operating funds or fund fellowships for
international lawyers to work with WHO on international legal
projects. International and national bar associations may also be
0
willing providers of financial and human resource support. 1
While WHO has to provide a core capability, it should not
neglect outreach efforts in building its international legal
capacity. Just as WHO has established WHO Collaborating
Centers on various issues of international health in order to
access public health, medical, and scientific knowledge in
different geographic regions, WHO could also establish a global

149. See also Taylor, Globalization and Public Health, supra note 5, at 14
(suggesting the creation of a health law division in WHO and arguing that WHO
must devote financial resources to fund it).
150. Existing law initiatives by bar associations could be useful models for the
public health context See, e.g., American Bar Association Central and East European
Law Initiative (visited Oct 26, 1998) <http://wwv.abanet.org/ceeli/home.htmil> ("a
public service project... designed to advance the rule of law in the world by
supporting the law reform process underway in Central and Eastern Europe and the
New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.").
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network of WHO Collaborating Centers on Global Health Law at
leading law schools around the world to seek analyses, ideas, and
guidance on international and national legal issues. New
information technologies, such as the Internet and electronic
mail, make it realistic to craft a global web of WHO Collaborating
Centers focusing on the international and national legal aspects
of global public health. In addition, WHO's growing use of global
electronic conferences in other areas, through which experts from
all over the world share papers, and comments on presented
papers can be harnessed for legal purposes as well.' 5 1
Law schools around the world may also be useful to the WHO
international legal office through the encouragement of academics
to undertake pro bono legal work for WHO and through the
sponsorship of internships for law students to work with WHO on
international legal issues. International law firms may also be
willing to sponsor some of their lawyers to work on pro bono
projects with the WHO, especially in the areas of international
trade law and intellectual property protection.
In building internal international legal capabilities, WHO
should also establish legal links with other international
organizations, such as the WTO, World Intellectual Property
Organization, and other U.N. specialized agencies that work in
fields that touch upon human health (e.g., human rights,
environmental protection). As noted earlier, other international
organizations have decades of international legal involvement;
WHO could learn from their experiences in belatedly starting
down this path. In addition, these links can provide WHO with the
opportunity to inform other international organizations about
health concerns arising in their respective areas.'
Nor should WHO neglect international legal collaboration
with NGOs on international legal issues of common concern.

151.

The WHO has, for example, conducted two global electronic conferences on

antimicrobial use in food animal production. See The Medical Impact of the Use of
Antimicrobials in Food Animals, supra note 136, at 3 (noting that of the 39 papers
presented in Berlin, 31 "were distributed electronically for discussion and comments
over a four-week period prior to the meeting in Berlin, to 522 experts from at least 45
countries on all continents"); see also Use of Quinolones in Food Animals and Potential
Impact on Human Health:Report of WHO Meeting, Geneva, Swvitz. June 2-5, 1998, WHO

Doc. WHO/EMC/2DI/98.10 (following same electronic pre-distribution as 1997 Berlin
meeting).
152. This suggestion parallels the desire that Director-General Elect
Brundtland expressed in her May 1998 speech to the WHA to support U.N.
interagency cooperation and to reach out to international financial institutions.
See Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Speech to the Fifty-First World Health Assembly,
WHO Doc. A51/DIV/6 (May 13, 1998); see also Collaboration within the United
Nations System and with Other Intergovernmental Organizations: Report by the
Director-General,WHO Doc. A51/19 (Mar. 23, 1998) (summarizing WHO progress
on collaboration within and outside the U.N. system).
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NGOs have had a significant impact on the development of
contemporary international law, particularly in the areas of
human rights, environmental protection, and international
humanitarian law, and their influence will continue in the
future.' 3 WHO should tap into the international legal energy
provided by transnational civil society as it attempts to build its
4
international legal capabilities.'1
The preceding suggestions have more in mind than creatively
cobbling together human and financial resources. While it will be
necessary as a practical matter to pursue a diverse range of
possibilities, the more important objective behind such a broadbased approach is the creation of a transnational community of
individuals, NGOs, governments, and international organizations
dedicated to building-up knowledge and capabilities for dealing
with the intersections of global health and international law. In

academic literature, this transnational community concept is
often
called
an
"epistemic
community"-"networks
of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue area." l s5 Any international
legal project at WHO cannot become an insulated program
claiming a monopoly on international legal information,
knowledge, and resources. WHO's international legal project
should build transnational networks in international law and
health that deepen and widen the commitment to the
Organization's objectives. But WHO, as in other areas of
international health policy, must be the initiator, leader, and
overall coordinator of the epistemic community on international
law and health. This objective clearly falls within WHO's function
of assisting the development of an informed public opinion among
15 6
all peoples on matters of health.

153.
See David P. Fidler, The Potential Role of Transnational Civil Society in
Health Development in the Americas: Lessons from the NGO Revolution in
International Law and International Relations, presented at Seminar/Workshop
on Health & Human Development in the New Global Economy: Experiences,
Opportunities and Risks in the Americas, Oct. 26-28, 1998, Galveston, Texas
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Fidler, Lessons from the
NGO Revolution].
154.
In her May 1998 speech to the WHA, Director-General Elect
Brundtland stated that WHO "must reach out to the NGO community" and that
she plans to "convene a conference with the NGO community to draw up new
guidelines for our cooperation [and] to establish new mechanisms for interaction
with civil society in Member States." Brundtiand, supranote 152, at 4.
155. Walt, InternationalOrganizations in Health The Problem of Leadership,

supranote 101, at 31.
156. See WHO CONST. art. 2(r).
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VII. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Concept of Global HealthJurisprudence
Although building the global epistemic community on
international law and global health is a necessary step in crafting
a role for international law in WHO's future, it is not a sufficient
step. It would be simplistic to argue that global health for all can
be achieved through international law alone. Ian Brownlie
observed that, until national systems of law improve their
performance, it is naive to place faith in international legislation
alone. 157 This observation raises the important connection
between international and national law on public health. As
Michel B6langer argued, the general objective of international

health law "is to support, guide, and coordinate national health
law."15 8 This connection requires the development of a global
health jurisprudence that encompasses both national and
international law on health.
Historically, WHO has shown some interest in domestic
health legislation, as evidenced by its publication of the
InternationalDigest of Health Legislation.15 9 Despite this interest
in domestic health law, a recent WHO pilot study of national
public health law in thirty-seven WHO Member States revealed a
global lack of capacity on public health law. 160 The pilot study
determined that WHO has to provide leadership in building public
health law capacity in WHO Member States, especially in the
developing world. 161
The pilot study's conclusion and the argument that WHO
should be more actively engaged with international law both
underscore the importance of the role of law in the future of
WHO. The two legal tasks cannot, however, be seen as separate
ones that can be pursued independently. International law and

157. See Brownlie, The Expansion of InternationalSociety, supra note 87, at
368.
158. Michel B6langer, The Future of InternationalHealthLegislation, 40 INT'L
DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 1, 2 (1989).
159. See supra note 113. But see Taylor, Globalization and Public Health,
supra note 5, at 8 (arguing that the InternationalDigest of Health Legislationis an
example of WHO's vision of its legal role "as neither active nor even reactive, but
merely observational" and noting that "WHO has traditionally devoted only a mere
fraction of its regular budget to support all the organization's legislative efforts").
160. See Aude L'hirondel & Derek Yach, Develop and Strengthen Public
Health Law, 51 WORLD HEALTH STATISTIcS Q. 79, 84-86 (1998).

161.

Seeid.at86.
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national law are interdependent. Presenting the WHO pilot study's
findings, Aude LUhirondel asked: "What would be the use of a
framework convention on tobacco if countries have absolutely no
capacity to adopt and implement domestic legislation in
accordance with this convention?" 162 This question captures the
national public health reform
fundamental interdependence:
often depends on international legal activity, and international
legal norms often depend on implementation in national public
health law.
Thus, international law in the public health field has to be seen
as part of a legal dynamic rather than an insulated level of law.
This legal dynamic is horizontal through international law across
the international system and vertical through domestic law within a
country. At present, neither the horizontal nor vertical elements of
the dynamic operate well. Just as this Article argues for the
creation of an international legal epistemic community to serve
analogous legal capacityWHO, WHO's pilot study advocates
163
building within WHO Member States.
The interdependence between international and national law,
and the need for WHO to take leadership in building legal
capacities at both these levels of law articulate the challenges of
generating a global health jurisprudence. Global health
jurisprudence can be defined as that body of rules, strategies, and
procedures that allows law in all its forms to support public
health. The objective of developing a global health jurisprudence
is to identify concepts, standards, and approaches that best
promote public health. Although the world's diversity will ensure
that any global health jurisprudence remains complex, global
health jurisprudence seeks to generate a common discourse about
the relationship between law and health. This discourse will
emanate from treaties, international regulations, international
recommendations and standards, international soft law norms,
customary international law, national statutes and administrative
regulations, and cases settling disputes. But the discourse has to
be fostered and nurtured by WHO as the world's health advocate.

162. Aude L'hirondel, An Initial Assessment of the Needs for Capacity in
Public Health Law, presented at the International Conference on Global Health

Law, New Delhi, India, Dec. 5-7, 1997. See also the concern expressed by Yach
that "most countries have virtually no institutional or human capacity capable of
mounting a comprehensive and sustainable approach to tobacco control." Yach,

supranote 79, at abstract.
163. L1hirondel & Yach, supra note 160, at 84 (arguing that WHO "should
address the global lack of capacity in public health law"); see also Taylor, Making
the World Health OrganizationWork, supranote 5, at 344 (arguing that "promoting
national and international legislation and legal institutions to implement the right
to health can make a critical contribution to furthering WHO's health objectives").
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Global health jurisprudence will not spontaneously appear for the
benefit of human health.
B. Dynamics of Global HealthJurisprudence
Although the concept of global health jurisprudence focuses
on law, it is important to note that it is also connected with the
formulation of global public health policy. Global health
jurisprudence only forms part of the response to the globalization
of public health. Foreign policy experts and international legal
scholars are actively debating how globalization is affecting state
power and policy-making in international relations. 164 A common
debate is whether globalization spells the end for the sovereign
state and the traditional Westphalian international system. 165
Often noted is the state's decreasing ability to control what
happens within its territory, which also draws attention to
problems facing the use of national law to pursue political,
economic, and social objectives. When confronted with problems
created by globalization, states typically have responded legally
by: (1) pursuing ad hoc, national harmonization of law, or (2)
16 6
cooperating in the creation of international legal regimes.
Behind these legal responses to globalization are interesting
dynamics that are important to understanding global health
jurisprudence.
Literature addressing globalization often argues that traditional
territorial-based notions of governance are losing their relevance. 167
Experts and scholars urge states to adopt more creative and flexible
approaches to policy-making that move away from territoriality as a
guiding principle. Wolfgang Reinicke advocates, for example, that
states contribute to the development of "global public policy" that
cuncouples governance from the nation-state and government." 68
He believes that "public-private partnerships" between states and
non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and NGOs,

164.

See, e.g., Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE

GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

13, 21 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997) (analyzing developments
undercutting state sovereignty).
165.
See id. (noting that "it can be argued that, largely owing to
globalization, the Westphalian system is already past history").
166.
See Fidler, The GlobalizationofPublicHealth, supranote 10, at 16-17.
167.
See, e.g., Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov./Dec. 1997, at 127, 131 (arguing that two types of national responses to

globalization, protectionism and interventionism, "emphasize territoriality as an

ordering principle of international relations . . . [and] are at odds with
globalization. . .
168.

").

Id. at 132.
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"could provide the foundation for global public policy." 1 69 On the
other hand, Anne-Marie Slaughter sees the development of
networks between governments on functional issues of concern
producing "a new, transgovernmental order" for international
relations that "offers answers to the most important challenges
facing advanced industrial countries." 170 Reinicke's and Slaughter's
ideas help identify arguments in favor of developing new types of
horizontal relationships (e.g., transgovernmentalism) and vertical
relationships (e.g., public-private governance partnerships).
Global health jurisprudence incorporates these ideas and
specifically applies them in the context of global public health.
Developing global health jurisprudence will require not only vertical
relationships among international organizations, states, and NGOs,
but also horizontal relationships between international organizations,
governments, and non-state actors. Global health jurisprudence calls
for the
intensification
of transintergovernmentalism,
transgovernmentalism, and transnational civil society. The earlier
suggestion that WHO establish links with other international
organizations in building its international legal capabilities represents
transintergovernmentalism because it advocates an intensification of

the relationships among international organizations for purposes of
improving
global
public
health
through
law. Transintergovernmentalism supports more sophisticated approaches to creating
international and national legal regimes in response to the
globalization of public health.
Transgovernmentalism will also be important to the
development of global health jurisprudence. Slaughter sees
transgovernmentalism operating between judges and courts of
different nations, and she argues that "[jludges are building a
global community of law." 1 7 1 Similarly, transgovernmental
networks on public health law can contribute to the development
of global health jurisprudence.
A serious problem with
transgovernmentalism
in
connection
with
global
health
jurisprudence is, however, the lack of public health law
capabilities in many developing countries. Slaughter's conception
of transgovernmentalism offers promising opportunities for
developed
countries
because
they
possess
sophisticated
governmental and regulatory units capable of entering into
functional transgovernmental dialogue. 172 Transgovernmentalism

169. Id.
170. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 184, 197.
171. Id. at 188.
172. Slaughter argues that transgovernmentalism "offers answers to the
most important challenges facing advanced industrialized countries." Id. at 197
(emphasis added).
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in public health law specifically and public health generally is
limited because of the inadequacy or non-existence of public
health capabilities in many developing countries.1 73 Given that
the greatest global public health problems, infectious diseases
and the global tobacco pandemic, primarily threaten people in
developing countries, transgovernmentalism between developed
states is necessary, but not sufficient in approaching the
globalization of public health.
This Author has argued elsewhere that, lurking in the many
regional and bilateral initiatives on infectious diseases among
developed states is the possibility of developing a two-tier
international infectious disease control system where: (1) developed
states occupy the top tier and enjoy higher public health standards
through bilateral and regional cooperation, and (2) developing
countries occupy the lower tier, have lower standards 'of public
health, and remain dependent on WHO and traditional notions of
internationalism.1 7 4 Before transgovernmentalism can become a
more powerful strategy for dealing with the globalization of public
health, much work needs to be done by international organizations
and developed states in improving public health systems in
developing countries. As such public health capabilities develop,
transgovernmentalism
can help
guide ad
hoc,
national
harmonization of public health law as a response to globalization.
This observation highlights some changes global health
jurisprudence would force on WHO's vertical relationships with its
Member States. Reinicke argues that international organizations,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
are increasingly focusing on matters of internal sovereignty, "the
relationship between the state and civil society," 175 such as

173.
See Eoin O'Brien, The Diplomatic Implications of Emerging Diseases, in
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 244, 252 (Kevin C. Cahill ed., 1996) (arguing that
"[w]hereas the developed countries have public health systems of varying
efficiency, many developing countries have non-existent or inefficient public

health services"). Transgovernmentalism in public health law may even be a
problem for some developed states. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL.,
IMPROVING STATE LAW TO PREVENT AND TREAT INFECTIOUS DISEASE (1998) (arguing

that infectious disease law in the United States is deficient and needs
reformation); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Law and the Public's Health:
A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99, No.1, COLUM. L. REV.

(forthcoming Jan. 1999) (arguing the same).
174.

Fidler, The Role of InternationalLaw, supranote 6, at 69. Examples of

transgovernmental efforts on infectious diseases by the United States with the
European Union, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and India are briefly described in

Maureen Bezubly et al., InternationalHealth Law, 31 INTL LAW. 645, 651 (1997)
and Maureen Bezuhly et al., International Health Law, 32 INT'L LAW. 539, 541
(1998).
175. Reinicke, supranote 167, at 129.
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poverty and good governance. 176 Similarly, the United Nations
finds itself increasingly involved in civil conflicts and civil wars.
The WTO also faces pressure to deal with labor standards and
environmental practices in the WTO Member States. WHO's
initiative on public health law takes it into the realm of internal
sovereignty as well because it involves analyzing and reforming
how a state protects and promotes the health of its civil society.
WHO has been accused of being "slavishly in thrall to its Member
States" and for allowing "[a]ppropriate respect for national
sovereignty" to be "overtaken by blind obeisance to narrow
national wishes."1 7 7 Global health jurisprudence will require WHO
to reorient its attitude towards Member State sovereignty.
The third horizontal dynamic important to the development of
global health jurisprudence is transnational civil society. Much
has been written about the growing role of NGOs in international
relations generally and international law specifically. 178 NGOs can
contribute individually and through transnational networks to the
development of global health jurisprudence as they have
contributed to the development of international law in such areas
as human rights, environmental protection, and humanitarian
law.' 7 9 WHO is becoming more aware of the potential benefits of
transnational civil society activity on global public health as it

participates in the creation of a NGO network called Global Health
Watch.1 80 The WHO recognizes that "NGO networks have a
unique capacity to monitor the state of health and social welfare
at country, regional and global levels." 18 ' The intensification of
transnational civil society activities addressing global public
health will benefit the development of global health jurisprudence,
and global health jurisprudence could become a focus of NGO
182
networks on global public health.
As suggested by the recommendation that WHO intensify its
relationships with NGOs on international law, the vertical

176.
See id. at 135.
177.
Fortress WHO: Breaching the Ramparts for Health's Sake, supra note
69, at 203.
178.
See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, T1vo Centuries of Partidpatiorn NGOs and
internationalGovernance, 18 MICH. J. INTL L. 183 (1997); see also Stephan Hobe, Global
Challenges to Statehood-- The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental
Organizations,5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, New Players on
the InternationalStage, 2 HOFSRA LAw & POLY SYMPOSIUM 19 (1997).
179.
See Fidler, Lessons from the NGO Revolution, supra note 153, at 3132.
180.
See World Health Organization, Concept Paper and Proposal for the
Initial Stage of the Global Health Watch (GHW) (NGO Forum for Health, Geneva,
Switzerland) (on file with author).

181.
182.

Id at 3.
Fidler, Lessons from the NGO Revolution, supranote 153, at 32.
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relationship between WHO and NGOs should undergo changes.
Reinicke argues that public-private partnerships provide the
foundation for global public policy,1 83 and such partnerships
between international organizations and NGOs could also support
the development of global health jurisprudence. Deepening the
vertical relationship between WHO and NGOs does not imply,
however, that the state has become irrelevant to the pursuit of
global public health. The state remains central to public health
because public health problems require central governmental
authorities to deliver services and conduct disease surveillance
within specific territories. Infectious disease control cannot, for
example, be handled through neo-medievalism in which power is
decentralized into the hands of supra-state actors and sub-state
actors that form global networks through new information
technologies.18 4 Slaughter's argument that "private power is still
no substitute for state power"' 8 5 is particularly apt in the public
health context. The purpose of deepening the vertical relationship
between the WHO, NGOs, and NGO networks is not only to assist
the WHO, but also to place additional pressure on states to
improve their public health policies, laws, and practices.
C. Some Principlesof Global HealthJurisprudence

Even given the problems with international and national law
on public health, global health jurisprudence derives some
substance through principles which have been the subject of
international discourse. For example, after the HIV/AIDS pandemic
broke, public health officials quickly saw that respect for human
rights is not only required by international law but is also the best
public health approach to the HIV/AIDS problem.'l 6 In Health for
All in the 21s Century, WHO stresses the importance of human
rights because human rights problems have arisen in many
countries in connection with a variety of government actions on
public health.' 8 7 Frequent human rights violations occur when
governments: (1) discriminate against individuals or groups
suffering from diseases by denying them access to public health
services or by singling them out in applying public health
measures; (2) deprive people of their liberty and security by

183.
184.

Reinicke, supranote 167, at 132.
See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at

50; see also BULL, supranote 36, at 264-76 (analyzing the "new medievalism").
185. Slaughter, supranote 170, at 184.
166. For an extensive analysis of human rights and HIV/AIDS, see generally
LAWRENCE 0.

GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE

AIDS PANDEMIC (1997).
187.
See HealthforAll in the 21st Century, supranote 82, at Box 5.
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applying compulsory public health measures against them without
clearly establishing that they pose a significant risk to society or
without providing due process of law; (3) fail to protect private
health information gathered by public health systems; and (4) fail
to provide their people with the infrastructure, services, and
information necessary to prevent and control diseases.1 88 In
addition, other human rights abuses, such as torture or inhumane
treatment of prisoners, produce health problems by causing death
or dismemberment and by deterring people from seeking medical
care out of fear of reprisal.189 Human rights law will factor
prominently into global health jurisprudence.
Another principle of global health jurisprudence appears in
the trade context: public health measures should not restrict
trade without scientific justification. Public health measures that
are not so justified disrupt trade without protecting public health.
The WTO's SPS Agreement enshrines this basic principle by
requiring trade restrictive SPS measures to be based on a risk
assessment and to be supported by scientific evidence. 190 The IHR
also embody the principle that trade restrictive measures need to
be based on a scientific understanding of the infectious disease in
question. 191

The precautionary principle also forms part of global health
jurisprudence because it allows public health authorities to err on
the side of caution in the face of scientific uncertainty. The
precautionary principle supports public health in the context of
international environmental protection because it legitimates

environmental measures that ultimately protect human health.
The precautionary principle also plays a role in international
trade law because it is found in the SPS Agreement. 192 It is also

188. See David P. Fidler, Statement on the Proposed Japanese Law for the
Prevention of Infectious Diseases (May 11, 1998), in Habataki Welfare Project
Special Report, New Infectious Disease Law in Japan, June 20, 1998, at 2 (on file
with author).
189. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Legislation and Communicable
Diseases: The Role of Law in an Era of Microbial Threats, 49 INT'L DIG. HEALTH
LEGIS. 221, 229 (1998). In connection with the adverse health consequences of
human rights violations, WHO's recent awarding of a Health-for-All Gold Medal to
Fidel Castro, a notorious violator of human rights, is certainly not a mark in
WHO's favor in recognizing the importance of human rights. See Citation,Award of
the World Health OrganizationHealth-for-All Gold Medal to His Excellency Dr.Fidel
Castro,President of the Republic of Cuba, WHO Doc. A51/DIV/7 (May 15, 1998).
190. SPS Agreement, supranote 108, arts. 2.3, 5.1.
191. See Fidler, Trade and Health, supranote 7, at 312.
192. SPS Agreement, supra note 108, art. 5.7.
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flexible enough to be applied in new public health situations to
19 3
help protect human health.
Another principle of global health jurisprudence is found in
the tenet of international humanitarian law that prohibits the use
of weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. 194 This principle acknowledges the reality of armed
conflict but focuses attention first and foremost on the health
impact of weapons. 195

As these examples suggest, a challenge for global health
jurisprudence is balancing health and other political, economic, or
military objectives. Striking such balances provides the key to the
utility of the laws touching on health. Balancing health and other
objectives is not easy in any of the human rights, trade,
environmental, and humanitarian contexts mentioned above.
Exactly when individual rights must yield to the interests of society
remains a much disputed issue. 196 The type of risk assessment
and scientific evidence needed to justify a trade-restricting health
measure also continues to be hotly debated. 197 Whether the
precautionary principle is really helpful in environmental or public
health contexts can be doubted. 198 How military necessity relates
to principles of international humanitarian law remains a

193. See Fidler, Legal Challenges, supra note 108, at 17-18 (arguing that
the precautionary principle is relevant to scientific controversies about the public
health impact of antimicrobial use in food animal production).
194. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, art. 35(2), reprintedin DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 387, 409 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989).
195.

See

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE SIRUS PROJECT:

TOWARDS A DETERMINATION OF WHICH WEAPONS CAUSE "SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING' (1997).
196. See Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases:
Challenges for International, National, and State Law, supra note 112, at 793-94
(noting the continuing controversy in American public health law about the
balance between individual rights and community protection).
197. See Fidler, Trade and Health, supra note 7, at 323-24 (analyzing the
problems raised in applying scientific disciplines of the SPS Agreement in WTO
dispute settlement cases); Dale E. McNeil, The First Test of the World Trade
Organization's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures: The European Union's Ban on Imports of Beef Derived from Cattle
Treated with Certain Hormones for Growth Promotion, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89 (1998)
(criticizing the WTO Appellate Body's handling of scientific disciplines under the
SPS Agreement in the Beef Hormones Case).
198. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle, ENVr, Sept. 1991, at 4 (expressing skepticism that the precautionary
principle is a part of customary international law); see also SUSSKIND, supra note
106, at 80 ("Even if the precautionary principle were mandated by international
law and the participants in global environmental treaty negotiations adopted a
no-regrets strategy whenever possible, political disagreements would still
emerge.").
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problematic issue. 199
The development of global health
jurisprudence will not permanently resolve these inherent tensions
between public health and other objectives, but work on the
concept can bring such tensions further into the critical spotlight
and foster a more transparent global dialogue about the delicate
balancing acts called for by principles of global health
jurisprudence.
On a broader scale, global health jurisprudence will also
involve examining questions of equity and justice. These
questions are important in both domestic and international legal

realms. The equity issue is especially acute for WHO at the
international level where differential power, wealth, and national
interests can easily skew international trade law and other fields
of international law towards developed countries at the expense of
public health in the developing world. The importance of these
questions is seen in the Organization's belief that its Healthfor All
in the 21st Century strategy is fundamentally a call for social
justice.2 0 0 Global health jurisprudence cannot fail to be affected
by such a call.
While the concept of global health jurisprudence may still
seem vague, it cannot be well-defined in the absence of more
serious attention to international and domestic law relating to
public health. Global health jurisprudence is offered not as a
blueprint or a substantive end goal, but as a dynamic process
through which WHO can develop both international law and
domestic law and integrate them together as important elements
20 1
in its global agenda for health.
D. Global HealthJurisprudence:Theory and Reality
A serious problem with the concept of global health
jurisprudence is the same problem that confronts much of the
"rule of law" activities that international organizations, states,
and NGOs mount in other areas: the gap between theory and
reality. As Thomas Carothers has observed, a gap exists between
the law reform recommended to a country and the ability of that
country to reform its law and operate the resulting legal

199.

See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The

Origins and Limits of the Principleof Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 231
(1998) (observing that "[tioday, military necessity is widely regarded as something

that must be overcome or ignored if international humanitarian law is to
develop ... .
200.
HealthforAll in the 21st Century, supra note 82, atpara. 3.

201. For an attempt to find principles of global health jurisprudence in the
context of public health problems created by antimicrobial use in food animals,
see Fidler, Legal Challenges, supra note 108.

1126

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1079

system. 20 2 In connection with international law, the same applies
for the gap between theory and reality in WHO's current lack of
capability to function effectively in international legal activity.
Planting seeds in inhospitable or barren soil is not the mark of
good husbandry. The pursuit of global health jurisprudence
should involve the close study of the successes and failures of
other "rule of law" and "good governance" efforts to avoid making

avoidable mistakes and to learn how to narrow the gap between

theory and reality. 20 3 A major purpose of this Article is to begin
preparing the soil at WHO for the planting of international law
and global health jurisprudence; but the tilling, sowing, and
nurturing remain still distant chores.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the role of international law in WHO's future. Whether WHO
realizes it, international law has had and will continue to have
effects on international health policy. In the future, WHO has a
choice: It can continue to act as if international law plays no role
in global public health or it can build the commitment and
capacity needed to integrate international law into its endeavors
and into the creation of global health jurisprudence. Building
such commitment and capacity will not resurrect WHO to its past
glories, but they may very well help WHO become more adept at
facing the multidimensional challenges now multiplying that will
complicate the successful implementation of WHO's global agenda
for health. In addition, such commitment and capacity will be
necessary to promote the development of global health
jurisprudence, to stimulate vertical and horizontal dynamics
supporting this development, and to generate dialogue on the
principles of global health jurisprudence.
Lawyers are not doctors' best friends. But the globalization of
public health makes at times for strange bedfellows. WHO's new
leadership should be encouraged to make both international law
and global health jurisprudence new and essential elements of
global health policy.

202. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival,
Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 97-98, 105.
203.
See id. (evaluating existing "rule of law" initiatives).
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